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The Endangered Species Act: 
Tramping on Tribal Rights?1
I. OVERVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT WHICH
MOST AFFECT TRIBAL RIGHTS.
A. ESA S 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. S 1533 faWl): Authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior (or Secretary of Commerce, 
depending on the species) to list a species as 
"endangered" or "threatened" based on certain statutory 
criteria.
B. ESA S 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(1): Requires all
federal agencies to use their programs and authorities 
to further the purposes of the ESA by carrying out 
programs for the conservation of endangered and 
threatened species.
C. ESA S 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(2): Requires each
federal agency to insure that any action it authorizes, 
funds or carries out is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of designated critical habitat. 
This section mandates consultation with the Secretary 
of the Interior (or the Secretary of Commerce) to 
insure against the likelihood of jeopardy or adverse 
modification of critical habitat.
D. ESA S 9(a) m .  16 U.S.C. S 1538 (a) (1): Prohibits "any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States" from importing, exporting, "taking," 
possessing, selling, offering for sale, delivering,
1 Adapted from an outline presented by Robert C. Baum of 
the Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior at 
the 1994 Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference.
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carrying, transporting, or shipping an endangered 
species of fish or wildlife, or from violating any 
regulation applicable to endangered or threatened fish 
and wildlife species. (See also ESA § 9(a)(2), 16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (prohibitions applicable to listed 
plant species).) The "take" prohibition is extended to 
threatened species by regulation, unless "taking" is 
permitted by a special rule applicable to the species 
in question. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31. "Take" is broadly 
defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 
engage in any such conduct." ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(19). "Harass" is defined by regulation to mean 
"an intentional or negligent act or omission which 
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by 
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly 
disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but 
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering." 
"Harm" is defined by regulation to mean "an act which 
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may 
include significant habitat modification or degradation 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, 
including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995); 
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.. 50 
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
E. ESA S 10. 16 U.S.C. S 1539: Provides exceptions to the
prohibitions of ESA § 9 including, inter alia, an 
exception whereby the Secretary may permit the taking 
of a protected species if such taking is incidental to 
an otherwise lawful activity and the permittee has 
submitted a conservation plan that provides for 
mitigation measures and funding mechanisms to implement
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the conservation plan.. An express exception to the 
take prohibition of ESA § 9 is also provided for 
Alaskan Natives (and non-native permanent residents of 
an Alaskan native village) if the taking is primarily 
for subsistence purposes.
II. APPLICABILITY OF ESA TO TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
A. Direct Taking Situations: Native American hunting and
fishing protected species for commercial or 
noncommercial purposes may be an ESA § 9 violation in 
some situations. See United States v. Dion. 752 F.2d 
1261 (8th Cir.) (en banc) ("Dion I") (taking of eagles 
for commercial and non-commercial purposes), on remand. 
762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Dion II") , rev;d in 
part and remanded. 476 U.S. 734 (1986) ("Dion III"); 
cf. United States v. Bresette. 761 F.Supp. 685 (D.
Minn. 1991) (sale of items partially composed of 
feathers from birds protected by the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et sea.).
B. Incidental Taking Situations; economic development 
activities may involve the incidental take of protected 
species, in violation of ESA § 9. City of Las Vegas v. 
Luian. 891 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The 
relocation of a listed species or the alteration of its 
habitat during constructing activities constitutes an
' incidental taking' that is prohibited by the [ESA] 
unless the Secretary grants a special permit"); 
Appendix A, November 19, 1993 letter to Honorable Ada 
Deer from Thomas W. Fredericks; Pacific Northwest 
Generating Coop v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 
1994) (loss of a few endangered salmon constitutes an 
incidental taking where they were caught because they 
are visually indistinguishable from an unendangered 
fish which was intended to be caught). The Secretary
3
can grant a permit for such incidental takings under 
the circumstances listed in ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. §
1539(B)(2).
C. Agency Action: federal approval of a lease or other
action requires consultation under ESA § 7 if it may 
affect a protected species.
III. APPLICABILITY OF ESA § 9 TO NATIVE AMERICAN TAKINGS.
A. Definition of "Person": the prohibitions of ESA § 9
apply to "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States." See ESA § 3(13), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) 
(defining "person" as, inter alia, "any . . . entity 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"). 
Native Americans are persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. See United States 
v. Nuesca. 773 F.Supp. 1388, 1391 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd 
945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Billie. 
667 F.Supp. 1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Appendix B, 
Solicitor's Opinion M-36926 of November 4, 1980, 87 
I.D. 525, 527 (1980) ("Martz Opinion").
B. Scope of Exception: Congress provided a limited
exception in the ESA for non-wasteful Native Alaskan 
takings of endangered or threatened species "if such 
taking is primarily for subsistence purposes." ESA § 
10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e).2 Courts have concluded 
that the ESA's exception for Native Alaskan takings 
does not extend to takings by other Native Americans. 
Nuesca. 773 F.Supp. at 1390-91; 945 F.2d at 257.
2 Although Native Alaskans enjoy a limited right to take 
species that are otherwise protected by the ESA, that right may 
be regulated whenever the Secretary of the Interior (or, 
depending on the species, the Secretary of Commerce) determines 
that the Native Alaskan taking "materially and negatively affects 
the threatened or endangered species. . . . "  ESA § 10(e)(4), 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(e)(4).
4
Tribes arguably may enjoy rights to economically 
develop their reservations and, in the process, 
incidentally take protected species. See Appendix A, 
Fredericks letter at 9-11.
C. Limitation. Modification or Abrogation of Treaty Rights 
bv the ESA: the Department of the Interior has
concluded that the ESA's "take" prohibition applies to 
hunting and fishing by all Native Americans (with the 
limited statutory exception for Native Alaskan 
subsistence uses) even where treaty rights may be 
implicated:
The [ESA] applies to Native 
Americans because treaty hunting 
and fishing rights simply do not 
include the right or power to take 
threatened or endangered species.
Appendix B, Martz Opinion, 87 I.D. at 529 and 535.3 
Interior takes the position that the line of reasoning developed 
under the Puyallup decisions and their progeny (that treaty 
rights do not include the right to take listed species) is
3 See Antoine v. Washington. 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975); 
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe. 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973); 
Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Hodel. 808 F.2d 741, 750 (10th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Eberhardt. 789 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir. 
1986); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin. 760 F.2d 177, 183 
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oregon. 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th 
Cir. 1983; United States v. Frvberg. 622 F.2d 1010, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United States v. 
Billie. 667 F.Supp 1485, 1490-92 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In United 
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 n.5 and 745 (1986), the Supreme 
Court held that Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seg. , 
abrogated the treaty right of the Yankton Tribe to hunt bald and 
golden eagles but specifically left open the issues of whether 
the treaty encompassed the right to take threatened or endangered 
species or whether the treaty right was abrogated by the 
Endangered Species Act. In United States v. Jim. 888 F.Supp.
1058 (D. Or. 1995), the federal court held that prosecuting an 
Indian exercising his treaty right for killing eagles under the. 
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act and the Endangered Species 
Act did not violate his rights under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993.
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preferable to the abrogation analysis described above:
There is a rule of construction which directs 
that a statute and an Indian Treaty must be 
construed in harmony, to the extent possible.
There is another rule which states that 
treaties are not to be construed to the 
detriment of the Indians, and a third rule 
which states that abrogation or modification 
of treaty rights by Congress are not to be 
lightly imputed. The question of abrogation 
or modification need not even arise if there 
is no irreconcilable conflict between a 
treaty and the statute. It is my opinion 
that the [ESA] is in complete harmony with 
the exercise of treaty hunting and fishing 
rights by Indians because those rights do not 
include the right to take endangered or 
threatened species and thus application of 
the Act to Indians does not restrict or 
abrogate their treaty rights.
Appendix B, Martz Opinion, 87 I.D. at 527 (citations omitted).
The Martz Opinion goes on to state that by making treaty rights 
subject to regulatory control under the ESA rather than 
abrogating them, "[t]his approach ultimately preserves the rights 
of the Indians while at the same time addressing the critical 
wildlife problem recognized by Congress in the ESA." Id. at 530. 
If attempts to recover the species are successful, the treaty 
rights would again permit takings of that species. Id. at 530 
n.6.
D. Means of Lifting the Take Prohibition.
1. Endangered species: the prohibition on the taking
of species listed as "endangered" was established 
by statute, ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 
1538(a)(1)(B), and can only be lifted by the means 
described in the ESA. To permit economic 
development activities to go forward where the 
taking of endangered species may result, ESA § 
10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), authorizes 
the Secretary to permit "any taking otherwise 
prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title
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if such taking is incidental to, and not the 
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise 
lawful activity." Such permits may only be issued 
if the applicant submits a conservation plan that 
includes certain necessary elements including, 
inter alia, mitigation measures and funding. ESA 
§ 10(a)(2)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
2. Threatened species: there is no statutory bar to
the taking of species as "threatened" under the 
ESA, only a general regulatory bar to such takings 
in the absence of a special rule. 50 C.F.R. § 
17.31. ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), 
authorizes the Secretary to "issue such 
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to 
provide for the conservation of such species." 
Section 4(d) provides an opportunity for 
regulations that, when consistent with the 
conservation of the species in question, may 
exempt threatened species from the taking 
prohibition in order to facilitate tribal economic 
development or to enable tribal members to 
exercise their fishing and hunting rights. 
Otherwise, an<incidental take permit may be 
obtained. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF ESA § 7.
A. Federal Actions Subject to Consultation Requirement: 
to the extent tribal economic development activities 
require action by a federal agency, that agency has a 
duty, "in consultation with and with the assistance of 
the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce, depending 
on the species], [to] insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . 
is not likely too jeopardize the continued existence of
7
any endangered species or threatened species or result 
in the destruction or adverse modification of 
[critical] habitat of such species" unless an exemption 
is granted. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
This requirement is triggered by a wide range of 
federal actions related to reservation development 
including providing grants or loans and approving 
leases or other agreements.4
B. Results of Consultation: the process of consultation
with the Secretary of the Interior (or Commerce) 
results in a biological opinion on whether the proposed 
action will jeopardize a listed species or result in 
the destruction of its critical habitat. If the 
proposed action will not have such impacts, the action
imay go forward subject to any mandatory terms and 
conditions in the statement allowing incidental take.
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). The action agency may choose 
to implement the Secretary's nonmandatory conservation 
recommendations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(j). If, however, 
the Secretary believes the proposed action would result 
in jeopardy, the Secretary must either include 
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the proposed 
action or state that no such alternatives are known.
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3). The action agency has the 
ultimate responsibility to act on the Secretary's 
biological opinion in a manner that is consistent with 
its duty to prevent jeopardy to the protected species 
or adverse modification of its critical habitat.
4 Consultation under § 7(a)(2) is not required where the 
federal agency lacks any authority or discretion to influence the 
proposed action. Sierra Club v. Babbittr 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995).
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A. General Standards.
A recent Secretarial Order clarifies the Department of 
the Interior's responsibilities for trust resources, 
requiring the component bureaus and offices of the 
Department, inter alia. (1) to "operate within a
government to government relationship with federally 
recognized Indian tribes"; (2) to be "aware of the 
impact of their plans, projects, programs or activities 
on Indian trust resources"; (3) to "explicitly" address 
any anticipated effects on trust resources when engaged 
in the planning of any proposed project or action; and 
(4) "to consult with the recognized tribal government 
with jurisdiction over the trust property that the 
proposal may effect. . . . "  Appendix C, Order of the 
Secretary of the Interior No. 3175 (Nov. 8, 1993). See 
also, Appendix D, the Native American Policy of the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (June 28, 1994).
The interplay between the Secretary's trust 
responsibility and his affirmative obligation to 
conserve threatened and endangered species in a context 
in which they support and reinforce each other is 
illustrated by two cases involving the Pyramid Lake 
Paiute Tribe's water and fish resources, Pyramid Lake 
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton. 354 F.Supp. 252 
(D.D.C. 1973), and Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy 
Dist. V. Watt. 537 F.Supp. 106 (D. Nev. 1982), and 549 
F.Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), aff'd, 741 F.2d 257 (9th 
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1083. In the 
Pyramid Lake case, which was decided before the 
enactment of the 1973 Endangered Species Act, the 
Secretary was ordered to utilize the full extent of his 
authority to fulfill his trust obligations to the Tribe 
by securing as much water as possible for the Pyramid
V. INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ESA AND TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES.
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Lake fishery and by reducing diversions of water away 
from the Pyramid Lake to a federal reclamation project 
to the full extent of his authority. In Carson- 
Truckee. the district court held that the Secretary was 
affirmatively obligated under § 7(a)(1) of the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1), to 
operate a federal reclamation dam and reservoir to 
benefit Pyramid Lake's endangered and threatened 
species even though the project originally was 
authorized for other, inconsistent purposes. The ESA 
was held to take precedence over the project's original 
purpose. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed while 
stating that it was not necessary to determine whether 
the Secretary was obligated to operate the reclamation 
facilities in that way because he had voluntarily 
decided to do so.
B. Tailoring ESA Enforcement to Promote Trust Objectives.
1. Listing of species and designation of critical 
habitat:
a. One of the statutory criteria for listing a 
species as endangered or threatened is "the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms. 
. . ." ESA § 4(a)(1)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(a)(1)(D). The existence of adequate 
tribal regulatory mechanisms may obviate the 
need to list a species pursuant to the ESA.
b. "Critical habitat" for a listed species 
includes the physical or biological features 
that are essential to the conservation of the 
species and "which may require special 
management considerations or protection. . . 
." ESA § 3(5)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)(A)(i). Information submitted by 
tribal governments could demonstrate that 
reservations lands do not contain the
10
physical or biological features essential to 
species conservation or that, due to the 
adequacy of existing tribal management of the 
lands, no special management considerations 
or protection are required. See Attachment 
E, Memorandum from Regional■Director, Fish 
and Wildlife Service, Region 2 to Area 
Directors, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Albuquerque, Phoenix, and Window Rock at 2-4 
(Dec. 6, 1993) ("FWS Region 2 Memorandum") 
(encouraging tribes to submit information 
pertinent to critical habitat designation).
c. Critical habitat designations take into
account the economic impact of designation, 
and areas may be excluded from designation if 
"the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the 
benefits of specifying such area as part of 
the critical habitat" unless failure to 
designate the area as critical habitat will 
result in the extinction of the species 
concerned. ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(b)(2). Tribes should "supply the [Fish 
and Wildlife] Service information on lands 
the Tribes believe should be excluded from a 
final critical habitat rule," including 
information on the economic impact of 
proposed critical habitat designations. 
Attachment E, FWS Region 2 Memorandum at 4.
2. Special regulations for threatened species: As
discussed supra, ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), 
authorizes special regulations for the taking of 
threatened species.
a. The regulations applicable to threatened sea 
turtles demonstrate how ESA § 4(d) can be 
creatively utilized to both conserve
11
threatened species and provide for Native
American takings. The regulations provide
that the prohibition on the taking of
threatened sea turtles:
shall not apply with respect to the 
taking of [green sea turtles] in 
waters seaward of mean low tide for 
personal consumption by residents 
of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands if such taking is 
customary, traditional and 
necessary for the sustenance of 
such resident and his immediate 
family. Sea turtles so taken 
cannot be transferred to non­
residents or sold.
50 C.F.R. § 227.72(f) (regulation adopted by 
Secretary of Commerce) (adopted by reference 
by the Secretary of the Interior at 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.42(b)(1)(vi)). This special provision 
for indigenous subsistence takings was 
adopted after the Secretaries considered both 
the potential geographic range of subsistence 
turtle consumption and the health of turtle 
stocks within that range. 43 Fed. Red.
32800, 32806 (1978). Subsistence taking was 
not allowed for residents of Puerto Rico or 
the Virgin Islands due to the absence of 
indigenous natives; native Hawaiians were not 
allowed subsistence taking due to fears of 
over-exploitation of turtle stocks and the 
ready availability of alternative food 
sources. Id. However, a subsistence 
exemption for residents of the Pacific trust 
territories was warranted both by the 
cultural reliance on sea turtle consumption 
and by the relative health of western Pacific 
turtle stocks, id. This special exception
12
survived an equal protection challenge by a 
Native Hawaiian. See United States v.
Nuesca, 773 F.Supp. 1388 (D. Haw. 1990),
aff'd . 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991).
b. Special regulation such as the sea turtle
exemption can be tailored to permit those
resource uses which are most highly valued to
a tribe as a whole. For example, the federal
government has adopted regulations which
allow takings of threatened species for
subsistence or ceremonial purposes but not
for commercial uses.
[T]he [treaty fishing right] 
includes fishing for ceremonial, 
subsistence, and commercial 
purposes. [The Department of the] 
Interior balanced the Indians' 
interest in fishing for these 
various purposes in promulgating 
the regulations. By according a 
priority to subsistence and 
ceremonial fishing, and imposing 
the moratorium on the commercial 
fishing, Interior sought to respond 
to comments reflecting the views of 
the majority of the Indians on the 
Reservation.
United States v. Eberhrdt. 789 F.2d 1354, 1359 
(9th Cir. 1986).
Similarly, a 4(d) rule could provide, where 
consistent with the need to conserve a threatened 
species, for takings associated with a highly- 
valued tribal economic activity, while prohibiting 
other activities that result in takings.
3. Tribal involvement in recovery efforts: recovery
plans developed pursuant to the ESA usually 
involve the services of a recovery team composed 
of public and private agencies and institutions, 
and other qualified persons. ESA § 4(f)(2), 16
13
U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2). Tribal participation in the 
recovery process can include representation on 
recovery teams, providing comments on draft 
recovery plans and implementation of recovery 
plans by tribal ordinance or code. Appendix E,
FWS Region 2 Memorandum at 1-2.
4. Consultation by federal agencies on actions that
may affect a listed species: when the ESA § 7
consultation process involves tribal interests, 
the action agency can and should directly involve 
affected tribes in the consultation process.
a. Requiring that the offices of the Department 
of the Interior consult with tribes affected 
by their proposed actions, Appendix C, Order 
of the Secretary of the Interior No. 3175 
(Nov. 8, 1993), facilitates tribal 
involvement in the consultation process.
b. Tribal involvement in the consultation 
process can include all phases of the formal 
consultation process, including, but not 
limited to, involvement in the action 
agency's development and review of biological 
assessments, invitations to each meeting 
between FWS and the federal action agency, 
the opportunity to provide scientific data 
and to review data in the FWS record, and the 
opportunity to review draft biological 
opinions and recovery plans and to provide 
comments on such drafts.
5. Prosecutorial discretion under ESA § 9: in
appropriate circumstances, the United States may 
exercise its prosecutorial discretion in enforcing 
ESA § 9 to take account of Native American 
concerns. For example, in 1975 Secretary of the 
Interior Morton issued a "Policy Statement on
14
Indian Use of Bird Feathers" that allowed Native 
Americans to "possess, carry, use, wear, give, 
loan, or exchange among other Indians, without 
compensation, all federally protected birds, as 
well as their parts or feathers," but reiterated 
that "the Department of the Interior will continue 
to enforce against all persons those Federal laws 
prohibiting the killing, buying or selling of 
eagles, migratory birds, or endangered species, as 
well as those laws prohibiting the buying or 
selling of the parts or feathers of such birds and 
animals." Appendix F.
6. ESA § 10 (a)(1)(B) incidental take permits: the
ESA requires that incidental take permits only be 
issued when the applicant submits a conservation 
plan that provides necessary funding for 
mitigation measures.5
C. Resolving Conflicts Between ESA and Tribal Activities.
1. In its March 1995 Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake 
River Salmon, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service purported to recognize and take into 
account the treaty and trust responsibilities of 
the United States to Indian tribes. The NMFS 
listed five criteria which must first be satisfied 
before the federal government would impose 
restrictions on the exercise of treaty and other 
Indian fishing rights which result in the
5 This same thing may happen when federal agency action is 
the subject of formal consultation with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the Service issues an incidental take statement 
permitting the action to go forward. See ESA § 7(b)(4), 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (requiring an incidental take statement to 
specify the reasonable and prudent measures necessary to minimize 
the impact of incidental take on a listed species and the 
mandatory terms and conditions necessary to implement those 
measures).
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incidental take of protected Snake River salmon 
stocks. The restrictions must be:
a. reasonable and necessary for the conservation 
of the fishery resource;
b. the least restrictive measures available to 
achieve the conservation purpose;
c. not discriminatory against tribal fishing 
activities;
d. necessary because the conservation purpose 
cannot be achieved through reasonable 
regulation of non-treaty activities; and
e. necessary because voluntary tribal 
conservation measures are not adequate to 
achieve the conservation purpose.
See Appendix G, Excerpts from March 1995 Proposed 
Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon.
The most controversial and difficult to apply 
aspect of these criteria is determining what does 
or does not constitute "reasonable regulation of 
non-treaty activities." For example, do major 
changes in the operation of federal dams, or 
perhaps the removal of some dams, which would 
increase the cost of electricity to all consumers, 
constitute reasonable or unreasonable regulation 
of non-treaty activities? How much would the 
price of electricity have to increase over what 
period of time in order for the proposed 
regulation to be unreasonable?6 The current
6
Significantly and by way of contrast, the April 1994 Record of 
Decision issued by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land 
Management for Management of Habitat for Late-Successional and 
Old-Growth Forest Related Species within the Range of the 
Northern Spotted Owl, Appendix H states that tribal treaty rights 
will not be restricted unless, among other things, "the 
conservation purpose of the restriction cannot be achieved solely
16
2.
positions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the 
Fish and Wildlife Service on this vital and 
apparently unresolved issue are set forth in 
Appendices I, J and K.
Another critical factor in applying Endangered 
Species Act restrictions to treaty and trust 
resources is determining "the environmental 
baseline." See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. If tribal 
activities which may adversely affect protected 
species are included within the environmental 
baseline, then as a general matter, they will not 
be subject to further restriction. The federal 
agencies administering the ESA currently enjoy a 
significant amount of latitude and discretion in 
determining what does or does not fall within the 
environmental baseline. See Wood, "Fulfilling the 
Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native 
Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial
Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises 
and Performance," 25 Environmental Law 733, 785- 
787 (1995).
3. The application of the Endangered Species Act to
tribal treaty and trust resources also may present 
issues of environmental justice. See Appendix L, 
President Clinton's February 11, 1994 Executive 
Order No. 12898.
CONCLUSION
If applied sensitively and correctly, the Endangered Species 
Act is a powerful tool which can and should be used to fulfill 
the commitments of the United States to preserve and protect and, 
if necessary, restore tribal treaty and trust resources and to 
enable Indian tribes to achieve standards of living comparable to 
their non-Indian neighbors.
by regulation of non-Indian activities." (Emphasis added.)
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• ADMITTED ONLY IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK 
”  ADMITTED ONLY IN OREGON 
—ADMITTED ONLY IN MONTANA
Hon. Ada Deer
Asst. Secretary .For Indian Affairs 
Department of Interior 
1849 C St. N.W.
Washington DC 20240
Re: Pish & Wildlife Service's assessment of a
$331,776 mitigation fee against tribal 
trust land development under the Endangered Species Act
Dear Ms. Deer:
This letter is written on behalf of the Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe to express our objection to the Fish & Wildlife Service's
assessment of a $331,776 fee on the Tribe as a condition of
developing its trust land. As you know, the Tribe has leased 
approximately 5,444 acres of reservation trust land for residential 
and commercial/resort development. Approximately 1,024 acres of 
the land has been designated as habitat for the desert tortoise, a 
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. The FWS has 
issued a draft biological opinion and incidental take statement 
pursuant to §§ 7 and 9 of the E.S.A. assessing the effect of the 
development on the desert -t'ortoise. .* One of the mitigation measures 
included in the dr aft$,£op inion is the so-called mitigation fee
assessed against the tribe as a condition to developing its land. 
It is our opinion that this assessment is unlawful in light of the 
Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, as well as the 
Tribe's treaty right to use and develop its land. Accordingly, we 
are requesting your assistance in getting the Department of the 
Interior to eliminate its practice of assessing this mitigation fee 
against tribal trust lands. Our reasons in support of this request 






1. The Secretary's Obligations Under The Endangered Species 
Act.
The purpose of the Aha Macav Development is to generate 
revenue for the Tribe, enhance economic development on the 
Reservation, and provide employment for tribal members. Inasmuch 
as the Tribe's lands are held in trust by the United States, the 
Tribe's lease of the lands is subject to the approval of the BIA 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 415 and related regulations. This in turn 
triggers the BIA's obligations under the National Environmental 
Policy Act and, given the presence of the desert tortoise, the 
consultation obligations under § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. 
The FWS's draft biological opinion was prepared pursuant to § 7, 
and included an incidental take statement as required by § 9 of the
E. S . A .
Section 7 of the E.S.A. requires the BIA to consult with the 
FWS to ensure that any agency action is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical 
habitat. 25 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). After agency consultation, the 
FWS must provide the BIA and the Tribe with a written opinion 
detailing how the agency action affects an endangered or threatened 
species or its critical habitat. If jeopardy or adverse 
modification is found, the FWS is then required to suggest 
reasonable and prudent alternatives which the FWS believes would 
not violate subsection (a)(2). See generally. Pacific Northwest 
Generating C o o p , v . Brown. 822 F.Supp. 1479, 1487 (D. Ore. 1993).
Section 9 of the E.S.A. prohibits the "taking” of an 
endangered species. The prohibitions of § 9 also apply to
threatened species, including the desert tortoise, by Agency 
regulations issued pursuant to § 4 of the E.S.A. The term "take" 
includes harm or harassment of a threatened or endangered species. 
However, "incidental takings" are permitted as long as they comply 
with the r e q u i r e m e n t s § ' 7 (o )(2) -of the E.S.A. That provision 
provides that a taking which complies with the terms and conditions 
specified in a written statement provided under § 7(b) (4) (iv) shall 
not be considered a prohibited taking of the species concerned.
Section 7(b) (4) (iv) contains the requirements for the 
incidental take statement. It is issued as part of the § 7 
biological opinion. See Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986
F. 2d 1568, 1580 (9th Cir. 1993). Section 7(b)(4) provides in 
relevant part as follows:
If, after consultation under (a) (2) , the Secretary
concludes that —
(A) The agency action will not violate such 
subsection, or offers reasonable and prudent 
alternatives which the Secretary believes 




(B) The taking of an endangered species or a 
threatened species incidental to the agency 
action will not violate such subsection;
The Secretary shall provide the federal agency and the 
applicant concerned, if any, with a written statement that —
(i) specifies the impact of such incidental taking 
on the species,
(ii) specifies those reasonable and prudent 
measures that the Secretary considers 
necessary or appropriate to minimize such 
impact, [and]
(iv) sets forth the terms and conditions . . . that 
must be complied with by the federal agency or 
applicant (if any), or both, to implement the 
measures specified under clause . . . (ii) . .
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1993 Supp.).
2. The FWS's Draft Biological Opinion.
The FWS's draft biological opinion (HB.0.M) incorporates both 
the § 7 biological opin-lorr;- and the- § 9 incidental take statement 
required by the above^referenced provisions. Significantly, the 
draft B.O. concludes that development of the tribal lands will not 
have a significant impact on the survival of the desert tortoise:
The Service has determined that the level of impact 
described herein will not reduce appreciably the 
likelihood of survival and recovery of the Mohave 
population of the desert tortoise in the wild because:
(1) desert tortoise densities within the project site are 
low, (2) the project site is near the Needles Highway and 
the Colorado River, (3) the project area is not within an 
area recommended for recovery, and (4) impacts to desert
tortoises within the project site represent a small 
impact to the Mohave population of the desert tortoises 
when total desert tortoise population numbers and 




It is our Biological Opinion that the proposed issuance 
of leases for construction of residential, recreational, 
and commercial developments on the reservation is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the 
threatened Mohave population of the desert tortoise . .
. no critical habitat will be destroyed or adversely 
modified by the issuance of these leases.
Draft B.O., pp. 10-11.
The FWS then incorporates the incidental take statement into 
its Draft B.O. pursuant to § 9:
The Service anticipates that four desert tortoises may be 
accidentally injured or killed by vehicles or equipment 
during the development stage, that 20 desert tortoises 
may be harassed by removal from the boundaries of the 
development, that an unknown number of desert tortoise 
eggs may be destroyed during the development phase, that 
an unknown number of desert tortoises may be taken 
through predation by ravens drawn to trash on the 
construction site, that an unknown number of desert 
tortoises may be taken indirectly in the form of harm 
through increased noise associated with the operation of 
heavy equipment on the site, and that a total of 1,024 
acres of desert tortoise habitat may be destroyed as a 
result of the development which could result in harm 
and/or harassment of'desert tortoises.
Draft B.O., pp. 12-13.
To mitigate these .^potential impacts on the desert tortoise, 
and in order for the exemption in § 7(o)(2) to apply, the FWS has 
imposed eight mitigation measures with which the BIA and the Tribe 
must comply (Draft B.O., p. 12)1. of the eight mitigation 
measures, the first seven are directly related to preventing or
The Draft B.O. indicates that the eight mitigation 
measures were proposed by the BIA. However, it is our impression 
that the mitigation fee was a condition forced upon the BIA by the 
FWS, with which the BIA does not agree.
minimizing any incidental taking of a desert tortoise within the development, including:
(1) the education of all project employees as to the 
threatened status of the species, and the potential penalties for an unlawful taking;
(2) the construction of barriers (either a tortoise—proof 
fence or a 12-foot swath of leveled land around the perimeter of 
the lease site) and subsequent removal of tortoises from the lease 
site with additional measures to prevent re-entry;
(3) measures to ensure that all construction activities are 
confined within marked areas which have previously been cleared of desert tortoises;
(4) clearly marking all tortoise burrows along road 
easements/rights-of-way to prevent crushing, including measures to 
ensure that tortoises do not enter rights-of-way thereafter by 
grading a 12-foot belt along each side of the right-of-way so that 
tortoises entering the right-of-way can be detected by their tracks 
and removed by a qualified tortoise biologist on a daily basis, and 
the placement of qualified tortoise biologists on the construction 
site during all grading and construction activities to ensure that 
the tortoises found are not harmed;
(5) the excavation and removal of all tortoise burrows or 
nests found on the project site by qualified biologists;
(6) restricting storage and access of all equipment and 
materials within the boundaries of the project site in existing 
rights-of-way and access roads;






The eighth mitigaEion measure imposed, and the one to which 
the Tribe strongly objects, is the imposition of a so-called 
mitigation fee which the Tribe is required to pay into an account 
administered by Clark County, which the FWS says is for "off-site 
mitigation for the destruction of desert tortoise habitat." Draft 
B.O., p. 7. The fee is imposed at the rate of $324 per acre for 
1,024 acres of the leased premises considered to constitute desert 
tortoise habitat (totaling $331,776) . The expressed purpose of the 
mitigation fee is for "securing desert tortoise management areas 
(TMA), habitat enhancement, and desert tortoise research." B.O., 
pp. 7-8. The fee must be transferred prior to the initiation of 
any construction activities. The question is whether, under the
circumstances of our case, the imposition of the mitigation fee is 
beyond the scope of the FWS's authority.
DISCUSSION
Initially, I note that the mitigation fee is not expressly 
authorized by the Endangered Species Act, or by the Secretary's 
regulations promulgated thereunder. Inasmuch as the FWS is 
assessing the mitigation fee against trust lands within an Indian 
reservation which was created for the express use and occupancy of 
the Tribe, and because the draft B.O. expressly states that the 
development will not jeopardize the continued existence of the 
desert tortoise nor modify any critical habitat, it is my opinion 
that the assertion of a mitigation fee is not within the FWS's 
authority under § 7(o) of the E.S.A. I seriously doubt that, in 
cases where no critical habitat is affected, the mitigation fee is 
lawful under the E.S.A. itself. Even so, when the mitigation fee 
is weighed against the Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the 
Tribe and the purposes for which the reservation was created, it 
becomes clear that charging a fee as a condition of the Tribe's 
development of its land is far beyond that which Congress intended 
when it enacted the E.S.A.
1. Legality of the Mitigation Fee Under §§ 7 and 9 of the 
E.S.A.
Since no critical habitat is being affected by the tribal 
development, and since the FWS's biological opinion expressly 
states that the development is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of the desert tortoise, there is no violation 
of the substantive provisions of § 7. See Pacific Northwest, 822 
F.Supp. at 1487-1488. However, the FWS may require mitigation 
measures even if there is no violation of § 7(a)(2). Thomas v. 
Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover, these
measures may be imposed under the incidental taking provisions of 
§ 9. Pacific Northwest, at 1488. Section 7(o) of the E.S.A. 
allows the agency to incidentally take a threatened species as long 
as it is incorporated * into "terms and conditions imposed to 
minimize the impact along with reasonable and prudent mitigation 
measures." Id- at 148 8.'
The draft B.O. lists four reasonable and prudent measures 
which the FWS considers necessary and appropriate to minimize the 
incidental take. The mitigation fee is imposed ostensibly to 
implement reasonable and prudent measure No. 3 of the Draft B.O., 
requiring that measures be taken to "minimize destruction of desert 
tortoise habitat, such as soil compaction, erosion, or crushed 
vegetation, due to construction or maintenance activities." Draft 
B.O., p. 13. Although this language indicates that the measure is 




prevent unnecessary habitat destruction, the requirement for 
implementing this measure states that the fee is imposed "as 
offsite mitigation for the destruction of 1,024 acres of desert 
tortoise habitat. Draft B.O., 3b, p. 15. This means the fee
need not be used for on-site activities, but can be used instead to 
acquire tortoise management areas and habitat and hire more 
biologists to help the FWS subsidize its work under the E.S.A. in 
other areas. See Draft B.O., p. 8. In other words, the Tribe must 
pay the FWS in order to develop its land, money which the FWS can 
then use for purposes unrelated to the Tribe's own on-site 
mitigation. Such a practice is akin to the imposition of a tax on 
reservation development, which Congress has not authorized under 
the E.S.A. or any other statute. Further, the uses to which the 
FWS can put the money off-site bears no resemblance to minimizing 
destruction of habitat in and around the construction site, as 
required by reasonable and prudent measure No. 3.
Moreover, the fee is imposed despite the fact that the § 7 
opinion finds no adverse modification of critical habitat. 
Instead, the draft B.O. purports to impose this fee under § 9 of 
the E.S.A., which prohibits the taking of a threatened species, 
without the special exemption authorized under § 7(o). Thus, the 
FWS has effectively expanded § 7(a) (2)'s prohibition on adverse 
modification of critical habitat by expanding the concept of a 
taking under § 9 to include harm to noncritical habitat. This is 
done by defining harm to include "significant habitat modification 
or degradation that results in death or injury to listed species by 
significantly impairing behavioral patterns." Draft B.O., p. 12. 
Although the FWS's definition of harm to include significant 
habitat modification was upheld # in Sweet Home Chapter Of 
Communities For A Great Oregon v. Lujan, 8 06 F.Supp. 2 79 (D. D.C. 
1992), aff'd 1 F . 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), not all habitat destruction 
or modification constitutes harm. Instead, the modification must 
be "significant." Id. at 286; see Palila v. Hawaii Dept, of Land 
& Natural Resources. 852 F. 2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (habitat 
destruction which could drive an endangered species to extinction 




2 It is interesting to note that in affirming the District 
Court's decision in Sweet Home the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
had some difficulty in accepting the proposition ̂ that the 
Secretary's definition of harm to include habitat modification was 
lawful under the E.S.A. Judge Sentelle's dissent likened the 
Secretary's definition to one in which the FWS "would deem a 
congressional authorization for the erection of 'No Smoking' signs 
to authorize the adoption of regulations against chewing and 
spitting." 1 F.3d at 11. Equating the word "take" in § 9 with 
significant habitat modification does seem to defy common sense. 
As Judge Sentelle pointed out:
In Sweet Home, the Secretary and the FWS themselves pointed 
out that the determination of whether there has been harm to 
habitat so significant as to constitute a taking requires an 
evaluation of the species involved, the biological needs of that 
species, and the degree of habitat modification. Applying this 
test here, we have a threatened (as opposed to endangered) species 
whose habitat spans portions of four different states, and a 
development which will admittedly not modify any critical habitat, 
nor modify a significant portion of the desert tortoises' 
noncritical habitat as a whole. Given this, and inasmuch as the 
Draft fi.O. concludes that the Fort Mojave Tribe's development is 
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the desert 
tortoise, the imposition of a mitigation fee in addition to the 
other seven reasonable and prudent measures cannot even be 
justified under the E.S.A.* I3 When the Secretary's fiduciary 
obligations to the Tribe and the Tribe's rights arising from the 
creation of the Reservation are considered, this conclusion becomes 
inescapable.
2. The Federal Trust Responsibility And The Tribe's Treaty 
Rights.
The Fort Mojave Indian Reservation was established by a series 
of Executive Orders in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The 




. . . I see no reasonable way that the term "take" can be 
defined to include "significant habitat modification or 
degradation" as it is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. I 
have in my time seen a great many farmers modifying 
habitat. They modify by plowing, by tilling, by 
clearing, and in a thousand other ways. At no point when
I have seen a farmer so engaged has it occurred to me 
that he is taking game. Nor do I think it would occur to 
anyone else that he was taking wildlife. He may be doing 
something harmful to.wildlife, but he is not "taking" it.
1 F.3d at 12r
If the FWS was stretching its definition of harm in Sweet 
Home, one wonders how courts would treat the imposition of a 
mitigation fee for the development of noncritical habitat, an 
administrative leap even farther from the mandate of § 7.
3 The FWS's practice of assessing the mitigation fee also 
seems to be inconsistent. We know of at least one other draft 
biological opinion issued in connection with activity on BLM lands 
which has been designated Class I habitat. No mitigation fee for 
the loss of this more important habitat has been imposed.
the Tribe. See, e.q ., Executive Order dated February 2, 1911,
reprinted in Vol. I Executive Orders Relating to Indian 
Reservations, p. 14; see Arizona v. California. 373 U.S. 546, 598- 
601 (1963). The Tribe's right to use the reservation undoubtedly 
includes the right to lease its lands to raise revenue, and to 
promote economic development and self-sufficiency in furtherance of congressional goals.
Executive Order reservations merit “the same protection as the 
Indian title to reservations created by treaty or statute." United 
States v. So. Pac._Trans. Co.. 543 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1976). 
Thus, the Tribe's right to use and develop the reservation in 
furtherance of a federal purpose may not be abrogated or modified 
unless Congress has made its intent to do so clear and plain. 
United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, et al., 649
F.2d 1286, 1298 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
Nevada v. United States. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
Courts are split on the issue of whether and to what extent 
the E.S.A. extinguishes tribal treaty rights.4 That question need 
not be addressed here since we do not deal with a provision of the 
statute itself, but rather the scope of a federal agency's 
authority to administer the statute. The Tribe is not asserting a 
treaty right to hunt desert tortoises to the point of extinction. 
Rather, the Tribe asserts the right to develop its land free of 
unnecessary constraints imposed by the FWS under the auspices of 
the E.S.A. The question then becomes to what extent may the FWS 
limit or modify the Tribe's exercise of this right.
Although Congress has the right to modify a treaty right, it 
does so only when circumstances arise which justify disregarding 
important tribal rights:
We do not construe statutes as abrogating treaty rights 
in a backhanded way, in the absence of explicit 
statement, the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty 
is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress. Indian 
treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast 
aside.




4 Cf. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1^70 (8th Cir. 
1985) (en banc) rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 7347 -'(E.S.A. does
not abrogate treaty hunting rights); United States v._Billie, 667
F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (E.S.A. does abrogate treaty rights
to hunt and kill endangered species); see Pacific Northwest, supra, 
822 F.Supp. at 1489; cf., United States v. Bresette, 761 F.Supp. 
658 (D. Minn. 1991) (Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not abrogate
Indian's treaty right to sell migratory bird feathers).
Moreover, in cases where a subsequent statute comes into conflict 
with Indian treaty rights, the statute "should be harmonized with 
the letter and spirit of the treaty so far as that reasonably can 
be done." United States v. Pavne. 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924). As
stated above, these rules of construction apply with equal force in 
determining rights arising from an Executive Order reservation, and 
a general statute such as the E.S.A. may not be interpreted to 
authorize the extinguishment of this right without a clear showing 
of congressional consent. Truckee-Carson, supra. 649 F.2d at 1298. 
Normal rules of construction of statutes of general applicability 
"do not apply when Indian treaty rights, or even nontreaty matters 
involving Indians, are at issue." . E.E.O.C. v. Cherokee Nation, 871 
F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, any ambiguity as to whether 
the E.S.A; authorizes a mitigation .fee as a condition to developing 
reservation land must be resolved in the Tribe's favor "in order to 
comport with traditional notions of sovereignty and with the 
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." Id.
Applying these rules of construction it is clear that the 
E.S.A. may not be interpreted to authorize the imposition of a 
$331,776 mitigation fee on reservation development, especially 
where no critical habitat of an endangered species is being 
destroyed and where other more direct measures are being taken by 
the Tribe to minimize harm to the threatened desert tortoise. The 
E.S.A. must be interpreted consistently with the Tribe's federally 
protected right to use and develop the reservation. The imposition 
of a fee to help subsidize the FWS's programs is neither authorized 
by the E.S.A. nor necessary to carry out its purposes. As such, 
the fee unlawfully infringes on the Tribe's federally protected 
right to utilize its reservation lands for economic development.
Not only does the mitigation fee infringe on tribal treaty 
rights, it is directly contrary to the fiduciary duties owed by the 
United States to the Tribe. The general trust relationship between 
the United States and Indian tribes is undisputed, and "has long 
dominated the Government's dealings with Indians." Northern 
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F,2d 741, 750 (10th 6ir. 1987) citing 
United States v. Mitchell ,— 463 U.S. .206 (1983).' Moreover, where as 
here, federal statutes^, and a comprehensive set of regulations 
require the Secretary to' approve tribal leases of reservation land, 
this general trust responsibility becomes a strict fiduciary 
obligation, under which the Secretary's conduct will be "judged by 
the most exacting fiduciary standards." Seminole Nation v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 (1942). The FWS is charged with the 
same duties in its dealings affecting the Tribe. Nance v. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981) ; 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dept, of Navy. 898 F.2d 1410, 
1420 (9th Cir. 1990) . Moreover, in cases such as this where the 
Secretary administers a statute which conflicts with its fiduciary 




carefully scrutinized. Navajo Tribe v. United States. 364 F.2d 
320, 323 (Ct. Cl. 1966) j Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v Morton 354 F.Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1972). ~-------'
The Tribe's leases in this case were approved under 2 5 U.S.C. 
§ 415 and the BIA's regulations thereunder. 25 C.F.R. Part*162! 
The regulatory scheme governing leases under § 415 is
comprehensive, and is dominated by the federal policy of ensuring 
"the highest economic return to the [tribal] owner consistent with 
prudent management and conservation practices." Gila River Indian 
Community._v._ Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
25 C.F.R. § 162.8). Imposing a fee upon tribal trust land as a 
pre-condition of development is directly contrary to the 
Secretary's trust obligations and is not necessary to fulfill the 
mandate of the E.S.A. The Secretary's administration of the E.S.A. 
must be tempered by his fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, and I 
can see no way of reconciling the two with the imposition of the mitigation fee.
The Secretary has discretion to accept or reject mitigation 
measures recommended by the FWS. See Tribal Village of Akutan v. 
Hodel, 859 F.2d 651, 659 (9th Cir. 1988). In this case, inasmuch 
as the Tribe's leases do not cover critical habitat and are not 
likely to jeopardize the threatened desert tortoise, since the BIA 
and the Tribe have agreed to seven mitigation measures to protect 
against any harm to the species, and in light of the Tribe's treaty 
rights on the reservation and the Secretary's fiduciary 
obligations, I believe the imposition of the mitigation fee is 
unjustified. Accordingly, the Tribe respectfully requests your 
assistance in getting the FWS to omit the mitigation fee from the 
final version of the biological opinion. The fee simply may not be 
reconciled with the Secretary's trust responsibility or the Tribe's 
federally protected right to develop its land.
The Phoenix Area Office has requested a meeting with the FWS 
in Las Vegas during the week of November 29, 1993 to resolve
outstanding issues under the draft B.O. I would appreciate it if 
you or someone on your staff could attend the meeting in support of 
the Tribe on this particular issue and other concerns raised^ by the 
BIA. I know that the'FWS is proposing an even greater mitigation 
fee on the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe as a condition to development on 
their reservation, and there are probably other tribes who have 
been detrimentally affected by this practice. Your intervention^ on 
behalf of the tribes could help convince the FWS that the practice 
of imposing fees on tribes whose reservations encompass habitat of 
the threatened desert tortoise is contrary to the principles I have 







I trust that you will give this matter your prompt attention. 




cc: Patricia Madueno, Fort Mojave Tribal Chairperson
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior 
Walt Mills, Phoenix Area Director 
Mike Anderson, Solicitor for Indian Affairs 
Wayne Nordwall, Field Solicitor, Phoenix 
Allen Anspach. Superintendent, Parker Agency 
David L. Harlow. Fish & Wildlife Service 
Jamie R. Clark, Chief, Division of Endangered Species
